We introduce a new notion of pathwise strategies for stochastic differential games. This allows us to give a correct meaning to some statement asserted in [2] .
realization of this control in the actual state of the world: more precisely, assume that Player II plays the control v = v(t, ω). Then, in the state ω and at time t, Player I has not observed the full map (s, ω ′ ) → v(s, ω ′ [0,t] ), but only the map s → v(t, ω [0,t] ). For this reason, the authors of the present paper introduced in [2] a notion of pathwise nonanticipative strategies, formalizing the fact that the players only observe their opponent's action in the actual state, as well as the path of the resulting solution of the stochastic differential equation.
Unfortunately handling such pathwise strategies is quite subtle and, in [2] , we overlooked some difficulties (we explain this in details in section 3). In the present paper we show how to overcome this problem. We still keep the flavor of pathwise strategies, but require the stronger condition that the players observe the control actually played by their opponent as well as the Brownian path (instead of the trajectory of SDE). The key point is that the players can nevertheless deduce the resulting solution of the SDE: to show this we use the pathwise construction of stochastic integrals introduced by Nutz [5] .
This note is divided into two parts: first we introduce the new notion of strategies and show the existence of a value and its characterization for a classical two-player zero-sum game with a final cost (to better explain our ideas, we have chosen to present our approach in this simple framework). The second part of the note is devoted to the erratum of the paper [2] . 2 The classical stochastic differential game revisited.
Let T > 0 be a deterministic time horizon. For all t ∈ [0, T ], let Ω t be the set of continuous maps from [t, T ] to IR d endowed with the σ-algebra generated by the coordinate process and P t , the Wiener measure on it. We denote by W the canonical process: W s (ω) = ω(s). We introduce also the filtration F t = (F t,s = σ{W r − W t , r ∈ [t, s]}, completed by all null sets of P t .
For any t ∈ [0, T ] we denote by C 0 ([t, T ], IR N ) the set of continuous maps from [t, T ] into IR N endowed with the sup norm and by B t the associated Borel σ−algebra.
The dynamic of the game is given by
with u and v two F t -adapted processes with values in some compact metric spaces U and V .
The process u (resp. v) represents the action of Player I (resp. Player II). We denote by X t,x,u,v the solution of (2.1).
Throughout the paper, the maps f :
are supposed to be bounded, continuous, Lipschitz continuous in (t, x) uniformly with respect to u, v. The sets U and V are compact subsets of finite dimensional spaces. We denote by U t (resp. V t ) the set of measurable maps from [t, T ] to U (resp. V ), while U (t) (resp. V(t)) denotes the set of F t -adapted processes with values in U (resp. V ). In what follows, the sets U t and V t are endowed with the L 1 -distance and the Borel σ-field generated by it.
Definition 2.1. A strategy for Player I at time t is a nonanticipative, Borel-measurable map
Strategies for Player II are defined in a symmetrical way. The set of strategies for Player I (resp. Player II) is denoted by A(t) (resp. B(t)).
Let us point out that, for all α ∈ A(t) and v ∈ V(t), α(v) is a process and belongs to U (t).
In the same way, for all β ∈ B(t) and u ∈ U (t), β(u) belongs to V(t). We denote by U d (t) the subset of U (t) of controls u ∈ U (t) for which there exists some δ > 0 such that,
is defined in a similar way. We remark that the elements of U d (t) and V d (t) are predictable for the original fitration F t . Now we can state our fix point lemma:
Lemma 2.2. For all t ∈ [t, T ], for all (α, β) ∈ A(t) × B(t), there exists a unique pair of controls
Proof. Let δ > 0 be a common delay for α and β. We can choose δ such that T = t + N δ, for some N ∈ IN * . We define on Ω t , U k (resp. V k ) the set of F δ t -adapted processes on the time interval [t, t + kδ) with values in U (resp. V ).
By definition, on [t, t + δ), the control α(ω, v) does not depend on (ω, v): we can set, for all
And in the same way,
Assume now that, for some k ∈ {0, . . . , N −1}, there exists a pair (
[t, t + kδ) and, since α is non anticipative with delay δ, it makes sense to set u k+1 = α(ω, v k (ω)) on [t + kδ, t + (k + 1)δ). By assumption, u k and v k are adapted to F δ t and α is nonanticipative. It follows that a u k+1 is also adapted to F δ t . The process v k+1 can be defined in a similar way. At the end it is sufficient to set (u, v) = (u N , v N ) to get the desired result.
The main issue with our notion of strategies is that it is not clear that the observation of the brownian path and of the realized control of the opponent up to some time t ′ suffices to compute the position of the system at time t ′ . The following Lemma-which is the main point in our approach-says that this is actually the case.
, there exists a measurable function
Furthermore the map F is nonanticipative, in the sense that there exists
Proof. Letv ∈ V d (t) and Pv t the law on V t × Ω t of (v, W ) under P t . We endow the set V t × Ω t with the following filtration : let V t,t ′ be the set of measurable maps from [t, t ′ ] to V and set 
On the filtered probability space (
, we consider now the following SDE:
3)
Then (2.3) has a strong solutionX t,x,α 0 which law, under Pv t on V t × Ω t coincides with the law of X t,x,α 0 (v),v under P t on Ω t .
We now apply the main Theorem of [5] to the above filtered space and the processes
We obtain that there exists a map F :
which is adapted with respect to the filtration (F * t,s ), such that, for allv ∈ V d (t) and for all bounded test function ϕ :
The nonanticipativity of F follows from the fact that F is adapted with respect to (F * t,s ).
We
, we define the cost function
It is well known that, for all pair of controls (u,
Lipschitz in x and Hölder in s, uniformly in (u, v). It follows that, for all (α, v) ∈ A(t) × V(t),
is also Lipschitz continuous in x and Hölder continuous in s, uniformly in α and v. Furthermore, for all (t, t ′ , x) ∈ [0, T ] 2 × IR N with t ≤ t ′ , and ǫ > 0 there exists R > 0 such that, if we denote by B R (x) the ball in IR N with radius R and center x, we have, for all (α, v) ∈ A(t) × V(t),
We introduce now the value functions of the game: for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × IR N , we set
and Proof. The proof is a straightforward consequence of the regularity of J.
It is clear that V − (t, x) ≤ V + (t, x). Moreover we have the equivalent formulations
Now we are able to establish a subdynamic programming principle.
Proposition 2.5. For all x ∈ IR N and 0 ≤ t 0 ≤ t 1 ≤ T , the following subdynamic programming principle holds:
In particular, V + is a viscosity subsolution of the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation
where
The map ω → π(ω) := (ω 1 , ω 2 ) allows to identify Ω t 0 with Ω t 0 ,t 1 × Ω t 1 and we have P t 0 = P t 0 ,t 1 ⊗ P t 1 , where P t 0 ,t 1 is the Wiener measure on Ω t 0 ,t 1 .
For v ∈ V(t 0 ), we denote by v 2 the restriction of v on [t 1 , T ]. We further setṽ 2 (ω 1 , ω 2 ) := v 2 (ω) and remark that, if v ∈ V d (t 0 ), then (ṽ 2 (ω 1 , ·), ω 1 ∈ Ω t 0 ) is a family of processes which belongs to V d (t 1 ).
Let us now denote by V (t 0 , t 1 , x 0 ) the right-hand side of (2.6). We fix ǫ > 0 and consider
Let δ > 0 be the delay of α 0 . We can suppose that δ ≤ ǫ 2 ∧ (t 1 − t 0 ). Let R > 0 be such that, for all v ∈ V d (t 0 ),
. We fix α 0 ∈ A(t 1 ) some arbitrary strategy. By lemma 2.3, there exists a measurable, nonanticipative map F :
We define a new strategy α ǫ ∈ A(t 0 ) by
and A k differs only by a P t 0 -null set, and that P t 0 (A 0 ) ≤ ǫ.
Since V + is bounded, Lipschitz continuous in x and Hölder in t, we get, for all v ∈ V d (t 1 )
where C denotes a constant which changes from line to line. Now let us come from the left hand side of (2.6): For any v ∈ V d (t 0 ), we can write:
Since J is Lipschitz continuous in x and Hölder in t and α k is ǫ-optimal for V + (t 1 , x k ), it holds that
(2.12)
Putting together (2.8)-(2.12), we get
Taking the sup over v ∈ V d (t 0 ) then gives the result.
The proof of the supersolution property from the subdynamic programming is standard (see [4] ).
In a symmetrical way, we obtain a superdynamic programming principle for V − and the fact that V − is a subsolution: Proposition 2.6. For all x ∈ IR N and 0 ≤ t 0 ≤ t 1 ≤ T , the following superdynamic programming principle holds:
Therefore V − is a supersolution in viscosity sense of the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equa-
We can now follow [4] to obtain: Theorem 2.7. Under Isaacs' condition:
the game has a value V + = V − which is the unique solution in viscosity sense of
(2.13)
3 Erratum to "Stochastic Differential Games with Asymmetric
Information" [2] .
The definition of strategy introduced in Definition 2.1 is mainly motivated by a gap in the paper [2] . This paper deals with two-player, zero-sum differential games in which the players have a private information on the game. The flaw in the paper is not with this information issue, but with some technicalities arising with the notion of strategy developed there.
In the framework of [2] a strategy for player I starting at time t is a Borel-measurable map α : an adapted control v ∈ V(t) and two initial conditions x and x ′ , there seems to be no way to built a new strategy α ′ such that the solutions X t,x,α,v and X t,y,α ′ ,v are sufficiently close (in particular, the idea consisting in choosing α ′ (s, f ) = α(s, f − x ′ + x) does not seem to work).
As a consequence, there is a serious gap in the proof of Lemma 2.2 of [2] .
In order to correct this, we have to change the notion of strategies and replace it with the one developed in the present note. This implies several changes, that we list below.
1. As in section 2, we assume that we work on the Wiener space
with the Wiener measure P t and consider, for all initial time t ∈ [0, T ], the canonical process (B s (ω) = ω(s), s ∈ [t, T ]). The filtration (F t,s , t ≤ s) is the one generated by the canonical process.
2. The definition of strategies (Definition 2.2 in [2] ) must be replaced by the one in Definition 2.1. This new notion of strategy must also be used in the definition of random strategies defined in [2] , p. 5.
3. The fixed point (Lemma 2.1 in [2] ) has to be replaced by Lemma 2.2. We setβ ǫ j := ((β ǫ j ) l ; s l j , l ∈ L) ∈ B(t 0 ), and finallyβ ǫ = (β ǫ 1 , . . . ,β ǫ J ). Then we can check as in [2] thatβ ǫ gives the subdynamic programming.
6. In the proof of the Corollary 3.1 in [2] , the strategy has to be changed in the following way: we set β 0 (v, ω) t = v 0 for all (t, v, ω) ∈ [t 0 , T ] × V t 0 × Ω t 0 .
